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The present paper analyzes the budgetary impact of various Social Security reforms in the 
Belgian institutional  setting. Our approach relies on parameters that were derived in Dellis et 
alii (2002) using a micro-modeling strategy. Focusing our attention on a hypothetical age 
cohort, we illustrate the budgetary impact that the reforms considered might have on the 




The various Belgian social security schemes face an uncertain future. The general trend 
towards demographic aging all across the developed world and large parts of the developing 
world has not left Belgium unaffected. Demographic aging is the result of a combination of 
two trends. First, there has been a substantial decrease in fertility rates of women over the last 
few decades. Second, we have observed a strong increase in life expectancy across most 
categories in the population. Unfortunately, these trends have a strongly negative financial 
impact on a variety of social insurance and social protection programs, ranging from child 
support payments, over the health care sector to the questions of retirement income and long-
term care arrangements. While the problem can be approached in a myriad of ways, we 
approach the problem from the perspective of the social security system, thus largely leaving 
aside the question of health and long-term care costs. While it is true that this focus inhibits a 
truly global view of the financial consequences of aging for government budgets, it is also 
true that introducing it would cause tremendous problems in terms of modeling the evolution 
of health-care costs, as well as in terms of a loss of international comparability.  
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 For the social security systems to survive this demographic process, higher contribution levels 
and/or lower benefits will have to be introduced given the outright pay-as-you-go (PAYG) 
nature of these systems. Indeed, a straight increase in the public debt financing of the 
demographic transition is not truly an option in Belgium, as it would be totally incompatible 
with the Maastricht criterion of the European Economic Monetary Union (EMU) relating to 
the level of GDP.
1 But even beyond this purely institutional limit, a further increase in public 
debt levels is also financially unsustainable, as it would at short notice cause a snowball effect 
such as the one observed in Belgium in the 1980's.  
 
Leaving aside these purely demographic considerations, other factors are challenging the way 
the Belgian social security institutions and systems are organized. First, there is the potential 
for increase labor mobility. At present, mobility between jobs in the public sector, the private 
sector and in self-employment is rather limited, at least partly because of the way the three 
systems work. The needs of the labor market of the future with its increased degree of 
flexibility may thus induce large changes in the way the three corresponding social security 
systems work. International job mobility is also becoming more and more important, 
particularly for a small open economy in the heart of Europe like Belgium. Jousten and 
Pestieau (2000) argue that both levels of intra- and intergenerational redistribution will be 
heavily affected by increased international labor mobility, even if the phenomenon is limited 
to some subgroups of the population. 
 
The second and biggest non-demographic challenge is the widespread use of a variety of early 
retirement programs. In fact, Belgium excels in the use of these programs as the world-
leading low average retirement age of approximately 57 for men clearly illustrates.
2 
Originally these systems were motivated by several objectives. Faced with an environment of 
industrial restructuring early retirement seemed to be the royal route out of the problem for all 
partners involved. First it allowed companies to lay off old workers and if needed hire 
cheaper young workers, while the government supported a large chunk of the costs.
3 Older 
workers were also encouraged by the trade unions to leave to free up space for younger ones. 
To the present day, many older workers believe that they take a decision beneficial to their 
younger counterparts. Third, the successive governments since the 1970's were also political 
gainers, though financial losers, in this consensus towards early retirement because it allowed 
the government to show a better performance in terms of unemployment (particularly youth 
unemployment) and guaranteed a social peace. Lately however, these early retirement 
schemes have undergone some scrutiny. Not surprisingly, the beneficial labor market effects 
have been rather modest, if not completely absent.
4 Recent discussions and decisions at the 
government level clearly move into the direction of lifting the effective early retirement age, 
and hence also the sector-specific mandatory retirement ages. Financial costs of early 
retirement programs to the federal government have been huge, both on t he income 
(contributions, taxes) as on the expenditure side (early retirement benefits).  
 
The goal of the paper is to simulate the impact of reforms of retirement income systems. The 
impact we are interested in resides on two levels. First, we consider the financial and 
behavioral impact on individuals and families. Second, we consider the financial impact on 
federal government budget. We do not restrict our attention to the budgetary impact on the 
social security systems, but rather on all of the federal government's finances. Such reforms 
will have both an automatic effect on fiscal contributions by changing contributions and 
                                                   
1 Belgian national debt currently hovers at a level of approximately 110 percent of GDP. 
2 The average age of retirement of 57,6 for men was estimated by Blöndal and Scarpetta (1998) on the 
basis of Labor Force Surveys. In this study we estimated an average retirement age of 58.4 for men and 
57.4 for women. 
3 Belgium is a country where the age profile of wages is steeply increasing with the length of the 
working career making older workers quite expensive.  
4 See Sneesens et al. (2002) benefits for a given work history (the "mechanical" effect) and an additional effect through 
labor supply responses to the reform ( the "behavioral" effect). We will estimate the fiscal 
implications of both the mechanical and the behavioral effect, using our retirement probit 
models derived in Dellis et alii (2002) to predict labor supply responses. The result will be an 
estimate of the steady-state impact of the reforms on the financial balance sheet of retirement 
income systems.  
 
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 describes the essential features of the 
various public retirement and early retirement systems in Belgium. In section 3 we explain the 
different components of our administrative dataset, as well as the key results of Dellis et alii 
(2002) that we heavily rely upon. The following section describes the simulation 
methodology used. The approach can be qualified as being of a "steady-state" type. Our 
methodology implicitly assumes that there is a time-invariant social-security program and 
time-invariant behavior, though this has obviously not been the case for the systems and the 
people analyzed in our sample, wh ere both behaviors and system characteristics have evolved 
over time. Section 5 describes the simulation results obtained. Again, it is important to stress 
that these results have to be interpreted with due diligence because of the limitations inherent 
in  our simulation approach. Though the results might be rather accurate for the cohort of 50 
year-old workers, this might not be the case for the more general population at other ages or 
for other cohorts. Section 6 is devoted to the conclusions.  
 
2. Social security schemes
5 
The Belgian retirement income system relies on three very unequal pillars. First of all, there 
are the dominant public social security programs that represent the largest part of pension 
income for a wide majority in the population. A second pillar consists of company pension 
schemes, which only plays a minor role as a source of income for the average Belgian worker. 
Essentially, they are currently confined to the higher-income individuals in the private sector 
and to the self-employed, a finding which is at least in part due to their tax-treatment. A third 
type of retirement income comes from individual retirement savings. These take multiple 
forms: First, there are tax-favored individual pension savings accounts with a maximum 
annual contribution of EUR 580 per person
6 or under the form of more traditional savings 
vehicles such as the tax-favored savings accounts, investments in trust funds, life insurance, 
etc. 
 
The first pillar, public retirement programs, essentially consists of four components. There are 
three large sectoral social security programs, one for the public sector, one for the private 
sector wage earners and one for the self-employed. Some special categories of workers, such 
as coalmine workers and military personnel have special retirement systems that we will not 
explicitly model in the present paper. A fourth large category of public retirement income 
consists of the guaranteed minimum pension system, that operates on a means-tested basis. 
 
Wage-earner’s scheme 
The wage earner’s scheme is by far the largest one according to the number of people 
affiliated with the program. The program allows for retirement starting at age 60, with a 
normal retirement age fixed at 65. The choice of the retirement age does not induce any 
actuarial adjustment under current rules.  
  
However, in the case of most workers, the choice of the retirement age is not completely 
neutral with respect to the benefit amount because a full earnings history consists of 45 years 
                                                   
5 The present section heavily relies on Dellis et alii (2002). 
6 All financial data are presented in EUR of 31/12/2001.  of work for men, a condition that many people do not satisfy at the age of 60. For those 
having more than 45 working years, a dropout year provision operates replacing low-income 
years by higher ones. The situation has so far been slightly different for women who only 
needed 40 years to c omplete a career. A transition (between 1997 and 2009) is under way to 
progressively increase the complete career condition to 45 years of work. Hence, for most 
women included in our dataset, a full career still consists of 40 years of work. Additional 
years can be added to ones career by working, but also by spending additional time on other 
social insurance programs such as unemployment insurance, disability insurance, workers 
compensation or early retirement programs. 
 
Benefits are computed based on the  earnings during periods of affiliation. The benefit 
formula, which is subject to floors and ceilings, can be represented as follows: 
 
Benefit =n/N * average wage * k 
 
where n represents the number of years of affiliation with the wage-earner’s scheme, N the 
number of years required for a full career (in our case either 40 or 45) and k is a replacement 
rate, which takes on the value of 0.6 and 0.75 depending on whether the social security 
recipient claims benefits as a single or as a household. The variable  “average wage” 
corresponds to indexed average wages over the period of affiliation, with indexation on the 
price index combined with additional discretionary adjustments for the evolution of growth. A 
peculiar feature of the Belgian wage-earners scheme is  that periods of the life spent on 
replacement income (unemployment benefits, disability benefits, workers compensation…) 
fully count as years worked in the computation of the average wage, and hence of the social 
security benefit. For any such periods, fictive wages are inserted into the average wage 
computation. In line with the general philosophy of the Belgian social insurance system that 
any such spell on a replacement income system is purely involuntary, imputed wages are set 
equal in real terms to those that the workers earned before entering these replacement income 
programs. 
 
Wage-earners pensions are shielded against inflation through an automatic consumer price 
index (CPI) adjustment and are subject to an earnings test. Currently, the earnings limit is 
approximately EUR 7,450 per year. For earnings above this limit, pension entitlement is 
suspended. Benefits are also paid to surviving spouses, or more generally surviving 
dependents of deceased wage earners.  
 
The wage-earners system is essentially b ased on the PAYG principle, and financed through 
payroll taxes that are levied both on the side of the employers and of the employees, with a 
combined tax rate of 16.36 percent (no earnings limit). The system also receives a subsidy 
from the Belgian federal government that is approximately equal to 11 percent of overall 
benefits. 
 
Next to the official wage-earner scheme, several forms of early retirement programs have 
developed: mandatory collective retirement and individual early retirement. During the 
1980’s and the 1990’s, an arsenal of mandatory early retirement schemes was put in place. All 
of these arrangements were and are based on collective agreements, which are negotiated with 
the active involvement of employees and employers, sometimes at the sector level, sometimes 
at the level of an individual company or production site. For some companies in a difficult 
economic position, mandatory retirement ages as low as 50 were introduced.  Individual early 
retirement differentiates itself from its collective counterpart by the fact that it is based on an 
individual’s decision to retire from work. During the years analyzed in our sample, the most 
prevalent way is to pass through the unemployment system in which unemployed aged fifty 
or more are considered 'aged unemployed' and no longer subject to show up at the 
unemployment office on a regular basis. Further, there is no control on availability to work, nor are there benefit cuts due to long-term unemployment.
78 Therefore, people unwilling to 
continue to work can ask their employer to lay them off. Similarly, employers can use the 
system to shed older more expensive workers. The latter is often willing to do so because of a 
lack of experience rating in the unemployment insurance system. In the early years of the new 
millennium, a new technique has even reinforced the use of the unemployment insurance 
system as a retirement route. The technique, called "canadry dry" pensions, consists in a 
lump-sum transfer from the employer at the time the company lays off its worker. This lump-
sum is formally not a retirement pension but clearly looks like one...  
 
Public sector employees 
Public sector pensions are paid out of the general federal budget and are officially considered 
as deferred income rather than old-age insurance. The only official insurance element is a 
coverage for survivor benefits, which is financed through a 7.5 percent payroll tax. No 
spousal benefits are available. Civil servants face compulsory retirement at the latest at age 65 
for both men and women. However, as for the private sector, there is a multitude of ways of 
retiring earlier than this normal age of 65.
9 There is disability protection, which is a much 
more plausible route to retirement than in the private sector system as the screening is 
considered to be much less severe. Most importantly however, it is possible to opt for an 
incomplete career and retire at 60. For some particular categories of workers, the normal 
retirement age is lower than 65, and early retirement provisions are sometimes extremely 
generous (military servicemen, teachers...). Public sector pensions are based on the income 
earned by an individual during the last 5 years before retirement. Benefits are computed 
according to a rather complicated formula but can never exceed 75 p ercent of the average 
wages over the last five years. The benefit formula can be represented as follows: 
 
Benefit = average wage over last five years * min [fract ; 0.75] 
 
Where  fract is a fraction with a numerator consisting of the number of years the person 
worked in the public service, and the denominator being a benefit accrual factor. This latter 
benefit accrual factor, also called “tantième”, depends on the rank the person occupied in the 
hierarchy. This denominator ranges from 30 to 60, taking the value of 30 for the highest-
ranking civil servants (high court judges, university professors...) and 60 for the lowest ranks. 
As in the private sector wage earner's scheme, the system is earnings-tested. The system also 
applies floors and ceilings which are  however much more generous than for private sector 
retirement benefits. Most notably, higher income individuals get a much better deal in the 
public sector than in the private sector. This finding is even reinforced once we consider 
indexation rules, as public sector pensions are indexed on average wages (“péréquation”). 
Public servants therefore enjoy the benefits of productivity increases in the economy even 
beyond the moment when they actively contribute to them as workers. 
 
Self-employed 
The self-employed retirement scheme is the latest one to have been introduced, as it only 
exists since 1956. It is also the least generous of the three big social security systems with 
retirement benefits close to the level of the guaranteed minimum income (see below). It does 
Self-employed are not entitled to unemployment benefits, nor to early retirement benefits. 
                                                   
7 The system of the "aged unemployed" was reformed in July 2002. The rules were tightened for new 
entrants to the unemployment system, with grandfathering rules applicable to those already in the 
system.  The minimum age for a full waiver of obligations under the unemployment insurance system 
was raised to 56. A new system of "mini-waiver" was introduced on the periodic visits to the 
unemployment insurance as of age 50, but the person still needs to ready to accept a job.  
8 Disability is not a major route towards early retirement due to rather stringent qualifying conditions 
and rather advanced screening. 
9 Currently, less than 15 per cent of civil servants retire at the age of 65. Disability benefits exist, but both qualifying conditions and financial characteristics of the 
system make it a most unlikely exit route to retirement. For a  very long time, old-age 
pensions have been independent of earnings levels. However, since 1984, the system is 
progressively being transformed to allow for a stronger link between contributions and 
benefits. Additional earnings past 1984 enter the pension c omputation formula at their correct 
value, instead of some fictive amount. Full benefits are available at age 65 for men with a 
complete earnings history of 45 years. However, anticipated retirement is possible as early as 
age 60 with an actuarial reduction of 5 percent per year of anticipation. As for the wage 
earners scheme, women are in a transitory phase, with the complete career requirement 
shifting from 40 years of work to 45, and normal retirement age from 60 to 65.  
 
The social security system of the self-employed is financed through two broad categories of 
income. First, there are direct social insurance contributions levied under the form of a tax of 
16.7 percent on the first EUR 46,035 of income, and 12.27 percent on the income in the 
bracket between EUR 46,035 and EUR 67,352. Income above the latter threshold is not 
subject to social insurance taxation. More than 75 percent of the contributions raised using 
this social insurance taxation are used for the pension system of the self-employed, the 
remainder serves to cover health-care and other social insurance benefits for the self-
employed. Second, the federal government pays a large subsidy to the system that 
corresponds to approximately 37 percent of benefits. 
 
Guaranteed minimum income  
The guaranteed minimum income pensions are fully paid for by general government revenue, 
and are means-tested. This type of pension is only available after the legal retirement age. 
 
3. The model 
We opt for an approach of micro-simulation relying on the data and estimates already used in 
Dellis et alii (2002). The underlying data stem from five different sources, most of which are 
of administrative origin. The different data were merged using the national ID number that is 
the Belgian equivalent to the US Social Security number.  
 
The first component of the data is the SFR (Fiscal Revenue Statistics) file, which are 
collected by the Finance Ministry, and then processed by the INS (National Statistics Office). 
We use the SFR files for the years 1989 to 1996 to extract all the information relevant for the 
computation of individual’s tax liabilities. Variables available include wage income and 
income from other professional activities, household size and type, number of dependents in 
the household, age and income of spouse, social insurance transfers and private pension 
receipt, house ownership status (owner, renter), taxable real estate income, contributions to 
second and third pillar pensions… The second component is the CIP (Individual Pension 
Account) that includes all career information relevant for the wage earner pension 
computation: gross wages, days of work, days on social insurance programs, etc. The third 
and fourth components are the equivalent datasets for the self-employed and the civil 
servants, both of which files are less detailed than the one for the wage earners. Finally, 
information from the Census (1991) is merged in to determine education levels so as to be 
able to use survival tables that are education-level specific.  
 
Dellis et alii (2002) used a multi-step sample selection procedure to obtain a sample of 
households where at least one member of the household is in the 50-64 age bracket and has 
not yet retired. A total of 21,818 households were used to analyze retirement decisions of men 
and women separately. Using the data, the authors estimated the parameters of retirement 
probit models. Among the explanatory variables in the estimation the authors paid a particular 
attention to financial incentive measures. To measure the impact of the social security systems incentives we use several different indicators. A first one is the concept of household 
social security wealth (SSW), which is the present discounted value of all future benefit flows 
from a given social security system. Discounting is done allowing both for time preference 
and mortality adjustments. Further, SSW also has to allow for the possibility of people being 
subject to different retirement income systems. The authors apply the official rules that exist 
for cumulating benefits from the three main public systems. Hence, the total SSW is the 
weighted sum of the different pathways to retirement available to the individual or the couple. 
The weights on the early retirement and the unemployment/disability routes correspond to the 
sum of observed frequencies of these routes among all people of any given age up to age 65, 
the public retirement system takes the residual weight. For wage earners, we add the 
unemployment insurance and disability insurance paths as the two systems produce very 
similar benefit structures. Doing so, we give an upper bound on incentives for people to retire 
as we render all of disability voluntary. Given the lack of information for the public sector, 
we consider as early retirees all people retiring before the age of 60. 
 
The next two incentive indicators are forward-looking measures. “Peak value” represents the 
difference between SSW at its peak and SSW today. The second forward-looking measure is 
the concept of “option value” such as defined by Stock and Wise (1990) that is based on a 
utility maximization framework. The utility function V t underlying the computation of the 
option value process can be summarized by the following mathematical expression: 
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where the first expression on the right hand side  represents the utility derived from labor 
income Y, and the second expression represents utility derived from retirement income 
) (r Bs ;  b is the time preference rate which we assume to be approximately 0.97, which 
corresponds to a discount rate of 3 percent, g corresponds to a parameter of concavity and is 
set to  g=0.75. Finally, k=1.5 expresses the relative weight of utility of retirement income as 
compared to wage-income. It reflects the fact that the income without effort generates more 
utility than income with effort. 
 
The concept of option value  ) (
* r Gt  is then defined as the difference in utility terms between 
retiring at the best point in the future  ) (
* r and now (t). 
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The key estimates of the authors are summarized in the following tables. 
 Table 1: Retirement Probits for Men 
  Peak Value  Option Value 
  Age  Age Dummies  Age  Age Dummies 
  Coef.  Std.Err.  Coef.  Std.Err.  Coef.  Std.Err.  Coef.  Std.Err. 
Intercept  -7.5957  0.2698  -2.4346  0.1690  -7.5110  0.3387  -2.2976  0.1709 
Incentive Measures                 
SSW (1000’s)  -0.0008  0.0003  -0.0008  0.0003  -0.0001  0.0003  -0.0001  0.0003 
Probability effect  (-0.0079)    (-0.0082)    (-00008)    (-0.0001)   
AC, PV, OV (1000’s)  -0.0380  0.0016  -0.0364  0.0017  -0.0392  0.0054  -0.0327  0.0054 
Probability effect  (-0.3769)    (-0.3505)    (-0.4111)    (-0.3383)   
Demographic Variables                 
Age  0.1049  0.0039  .  .  0.1050  0.0053  .  . 
Married  0.1027  0.0499  0.1026  0.0505  0.0294  0.0488  0.0342  0.0495 
Active Spouse  -0.0501  0.0394  -0.0515  0.0399  -0.0857  0.0383  -0.0839  0.0388 
Age Difference  -0.0003  0.0039  -0.0001  0.0039  -0.0009  0.0038  -0.0015  0.0039 
Dependent  -0.0999  0.0361  -0.0911  0.0364  -0.0729  0.0352  -0.0754  0.0355 
Income Earnings Variables                 
Life Cycle Earnings   0.0138  0.0066  0.0151  0.0068  0.0155  0.0066  0.0180  0.0068 
Earnings (1000’s)  -0.0084  0.0012  -0.0084  0.0012  0.0014  0.0018  -0.0002  0.0018 
Spouse Earnings (1000’s)  0.0043  0.0024  0.0044  0.0024  0.0037  0.0024  0.0031  0.0024 
Age and Schemes Dummies                  
Age51  .  .  0.0523  0.0827  .  .  0.0134  0.0808 
Age52  .  .  0.2779  0.0779  .  .  0.2289  0.0763 
Age53  .  .  0.3191  0.0788  .  .  0.2087  0.0773 
Age54  .  .  0.4516  0.0773  .  .  0.2871  0.0760 
Age55  .  .  0.6751  0.0720  .  .  0.5664  0.0718 
Age56  .  .  0.6429  0.0740  .  .  0.5003  0.0745 
Age57  .  .  0.8546  0.0723  .  .  0.7359  0.0738 
Age58  .  .  1.0048  0.0734  .  .  0.8659  0.0760 
Age59  .  .  0.7310  0.0833  .  .  0.4475  0.0869 
Age60  .  .  1.4439  0.0745  .  .  1.4456  0.0816 
Age61  .  .  1.4396  0.0806  .  .  1.4302  0.0876 
Age62  .  .  0.9767  0.0958  .  .  0.9868  0.1028 
Age63  .  .  1.0380  0.1023  .  .  1.0364  0.1097 
Age64  .  .  0.9208  0.1129  .  .  0.9320  0.1198 
Age65  .  .  1.9180  0.1083  .  .  1.9801  0.1191 
Civil Servant  0.6314  0.1258  0.6177  0.1277  0.3850  0.1254  0.3858  0.1281 
Self-Employed  -0.0328  0.1235  -0.0216  0.1254  -0.0408  0.1244  -0.0396  0.1271 
Pseudo R
2  0.1901  0.2067  0.1512  0.1741 
Source: Dellis et alii (2002), Financial values in US$ at the exchange rate of 0,942 EUR/US$ of 
31/12/1999 Table 2: Retirement Probits for Women 
  Peak Value  Option Value 
  Age  Age Dummies  Age  Age Dummies 
  Coef.  Std.Err.  Coef.  Std.Err.  Coef.  Std.Err.  Coef.  Std.Err. 
Intercept  -6.2897  0.4100  -1.8504  0.2497  -4.7976  0.5161  -1.5951  0.2554 
Incentive Measures                 
SSW (1000’s)  -0.0003  0.0003  -0.0001  0.0004  -0.0007  0.0004  -0.0004  0.0004 
Probability effect  (-0.0042)    (-0.0001)    (-0.0089)    (-0.0048)   
AC, PV, OV (1000’s)  -0.0307  0.0023  -0.0222  0.0024  -0.0793  0.0089  -0.0651  0.0091 
Probability effect  (-0.3940)    (-0.2868)    (-1.0341)    (-0.8434)   
Demographic Variables                 
Age  0.0887  0.0060  .  .  0.0641  0.0080  .  . 
Married  0.2222  0.0708  0.2030  0.0725  0.2269  0.0709  0.2079  0.0729 
Active Spouse  -0.0367  0.0552  -0.0606  0.0566  -0.0784  0.0544  -0.0920  0.0560 
Age Difference  0.0206  0.0063  0.0145  0.0064  0.0288  0.0066  0.0226  0.0068 
Dependent  -0.1539  0.0586  -0.1687  0.0590  -0.1346  0.0580  -0.1575  0.0587 
Income Earnings Variables                 
Life Cycle Earnings  0.0081  0.0104  0.0062  0.0106  0.0069  0.0106  0.0053  0.0107 
Earnings (1000’s)  -0.0090  0.0027  -0.0084  0.0027  0.0125  0.0038  0.0102  0.0039 
Spouse Earnings (1000’s)  -0.0021  0.0020  -0.0017  0.0020  -0.0011  0.0020  -0.0010  0.0021 
Age and Schemes Dummies                  
Age51  .  .  0.0094  0.0923  .  .  -0.0462  0.0922 
Age52  .  .  0.2391  0.0877  .  .  0.1767  0.0876 
Age53  .  .  0.3247  0.0897  .  .  0.2195  0.0899 
Age54  .  .  0.2192  0.0951  .  .  0.0871  0.0955 
Age55  .  .  0.4942  0.0888  .  .  0.3306  0.0906 
Age56  .  .  0.3489  0.0942  .  .  0.1500  0.0973 
Age57  .  .  0.5099  0.0951  .  .  0.2681  0.1001 
Age58  .  .  0.3334  0.1060  .  .  0.0456  0.1128 
Age59  .  .  0.2208  0.1161  .  .  -0.1246  0.1261 
Age60  .  .  1.4579  0.0973  .  .  1.2533  0.1123 
Age61  .  .  1.6646  0.1124  .  .  1.4447  0.1243 
Age62  .  .  0.5275  0.1795  .  .  0.2841  0.1881 
Age63  .  .  0.4805  0.1976  .  .  0.2177  0.2072 
Age64  .  .  0.9965  0.1988  .  .  0.6746  0.2108 
Age65  .  .  1.3057  0.2116  .  .  1.0055  0.2218 
Civil Servant  0.2851  0.1224  0.2128  0.1248  0.1541  0.1228  0.1287  0.1252 
Self-Employed  -0.2508  0.1292  -0.2766  0.1319  -0.2041  0.1300  -0.2281  0.1330 
Pseudo R
2  0.1536  0.1918  0.1365  0.1860 
Source: Dellis et alii (2002), Financial values in US$ at the exchange rate of 0,942 EUR/US$ of 
31/12/1999 
 4. Simulation methodology 
 
For our simulations purposes, we restrict our attention to a sub sample of the previously 
discussed dataset. We use a cross-section of individuals instead of the entire age range 50-64. 
More specifically, we consider pre-retirement age workers (male and female) aged 50 and 
then age them forward. We also include their spouses in the analysis. More specifically, we 
select all 50 year-old men and 50 year-old single females of the sample. Married 50 year-old 
females are e xcluded from the sample to avoid double counting, as our sample will account 
for the fiscal impact of all married females. This way, the cohort can be defined as a 
representative sample of the Belgian 50 year-old workers and their spouses. To ensure a 
sufficient sample size, we use a synthetic age 50 cohort made up of individuals aged 50 in 
1993, 1994 or 1995. This gives us a total sample size of 4927 individuals, 2515 men, 2020 
dependent women and 392 working women.  
 
We first estimate the probability that each worker will exit the labor force via death or 
retirement at each future age. Exit probabilities are computed using the estimates of table 1 
under the baseline setting with regards to all variables, including the SSW and peak and 
option value indicators. Spouses are supposed to retire at the early retirement age of the 
corresponding retirement scheme. In a second step, all these probabilities then serve as 
weights in the computation of the present discounted value (PDV) of the in- and outflows 
from the government budget. The financial flows considered are all flows from age 50 up 
until death.
10 This marks a difference with respect to Dellis et alii (2002) as we consider the 
full budgetary costs and benefits of the synthetic cohort as it ages. The total i mpact of 
individuals on the government's budget is measured as the difference between the outflows 
from the budget as measured by the flow of social security and other social insurance program 
benefits (unemployment and early retirement) and the inflows as measured by payroll, income 
and consumption taxes. Payroll taxes include health, retirement, unemployment, disability, 
professional sickness and workers compensation contributions.  
 
Next to the abovementioned payroll taxes, we include income taxes on labor and pension 
income as well as indirect taxes under the form of VAT. We incorporate direct taxes in 
accordance with the Belgian Personal Income Tax Code IPP (Personal Income Tax), thus also 
including the favorable tax treatment of pension income. However, to render the computation 
feasible, we have fully individualized the tax accounts of husbands and wives while the tax 
code only allows a partial splitting of incomes of spouses. Further, we decided to ignore some 
other tax code provisions. For example, we left aside the possibility to itemize deductions in 
favor of the standard flat-rate deduction, and we ignore taxation of private annuity income. 
The likely impact of these simplifications is difficult to sign as these omissions are to some 
degree offsetting. As for the VAT part, we rely on consumption data by income quartiles from 
the Household Budget Survey of the INS. Using the expenditure shares of different products 
in the typical household consumption basket by income quartile and weighting the 
corresponding VAT rates accordingly, the INS data imply an average VAT rate by income of 
10,65 percent for the lowest income quartile, 10,60 for the second, 10,04 for the third and 
9,14 for the top income quartile. We apply these average rates for all age groups in a uniform 
way. 
 
The concept of PDV is the basis for comparison among different policy reform scenarios. We 
do so by re-estimating the exit probabilities, benefits, contributions and taxes under several 
reforms proposals for both spouses to obtain new PDV estimates. We even break down the 
                                                   
10 To ensure international comparability across different countries considered, we discount all financial 
variables back to the age of 55 using a 3 percent real discount rate.  
 total effect of a reform on the PDV into its components: the mechanical budgetary effect 
(with unchanged retirement probabilities with respect to the pre-reform situation) and the 
fiscal implications of the behavioral  effect. We use the terminology "fiscal implications of the 
behavioral effect" to measure the budgetary impact of the labor supply reactions (which is 
properly speaking the change in the behavior of the individual). Indeed, this distinction is 
rather important, as it is quite imaginable to have a strong labor supply reaction, while at the 
same time having a very limited budgetary impact thereof due to a high degree of actuarial 
neutrality.  
5. Simulation results 
 
We consider four different reforms. The first three reforms share the common feature that 
they are not intended as policy recommendations, but rather to allow international 
comparisons. The fourth simulation is an interesting country-specific reform of the retirement 
system, whose only aim is to illustrate the impact of a partial reform within the Belgian 
institutional setting. None of the four reforms however pursues an objective of budget 
neutrality with respect to the baseline, which corresponds to the current institutional setting 
and hence not necessarily to one that is viable in the long-run. Nor does any of these reforms 
aim at establishing a balanced and viable budget in the long-run.
11 The first two reforms have 
already been explored in Dellis et alii (2002) with respect to their impact on the  SSW and 
accrual variables. However, the present exercise distinguishes itself clearly from the previous 
results as it incorporates a complete analysis of all budgetary implications of a retirement 
system change.  
 
The first reform is called the "plus three years" reform and consists in a simple increase by 
three years of all key parameters in all retirement and early retirement systems in the country. 
Thus, the early and the normal entitlement ages are increased by 3 years, as is the length of a 
normal career from 45 to 48 years. All other system characteristics remain unchanged. 
Implicitly, this approach includes the rather implausible condition that unemployment 
benefits are totally absent from the landscape between the ages of 50 and 53.  
 
The second reform, the so-called "common reform", creates a system that is identical across 
all countries. The common system has a benefit equal to 60 percent of average real lifetime 
earnings at normal retirement age (NRA) that is defined to be at age 65. Past wages are 
deflated using real wage indexing. Average lifetime earnings are supposed to correspond to 
the highest 40 years of indexed earnings during an individual's working life. In case a worker 
has less than 40 years of earnings, zeros are averaged in, while a career longer than 40 years 
has an impact on the real average lifetime wage through a dropout year provision. Early 
retirement is available as of the age of 60 (ERA), with an actuarial adjustment of 6 percent 
per year of anticipation. Benefits thus defined a re capped at the 90
th percentile of the wage 
distribution for men. Benefits are subject to income taxation under the same rules as in the 
pre-reform world. Survivor benefits are paid out at a rate of 100 percent of workers benefits, 
but are reduced one for one for every euro of own benefits the recipients receives on his/her 
own earnings history. No other benefits are available, which thus represents a rather dramatic 
change in benefit availability before the age of 60 in a country like Belgium. 
 
The third  reform is called the "actuarial adjustment reform". The approach can be located 
midway between the previous two reforms and hence its results will be presented in second 
place in the Tables and Figures that follow. The reform keeps the structure of the sectoral 
social security schemes unchanged with respect to the present, including eligibility ages, 
minimum contribution periods, as well as formulae for the computation of the basic benefits. 
However, the reform introduces an actuarial adjustment factor to v ary the benefit flow as a 
                                                   
11 Hopefully they are more viable than the status quo. function of the exit age of the labor force, or expressed differently the entry age into 
retirement. The linear adjustment factor is of 6 percent per year of deviation from the normal 
retirement age, which is currently 65 under all 3 major Belgian sectoral pension schemes. 
Means-tested programs as well as survivor and spousal benefits are kept unchanged in their 
generosity with respect to the baseline situation, unless they are directly linked to the worker's 
own benefits. The age dependent nature of workers' retirement benefits thus implies a relative 
increase in the attractiveness of means-tested programs for younger retirees. 
 
The last reform considered is a "Belgian-specific" reform. We consider a reform where the 
government reforms the current wage-earner scheme by no longer crediting years spent on all 
kinds of social insurance programs such as unemployment insurance, disability insurance and 
early retirement in the individuals pension record. All other system characteristics a re 
supposed to remain unchanged, thus leaving the early retirement and unemployment paths 
into retirement intact. Thus people will be confronted with incomplete careers at the end of 
their working life. There is thus a smaller buffering effect against income shocks on a lifetime 
basis. Another way of looking at the problem is to notice that the reform introduces a stronger 
link between contributions and benefits, and hence reinforces the pure insurance aspect of the 
system.  
 
For evaluating the results of the first three simulations, we use simulation methods S1, S2 and 
S3 of Dellis et alii (2002). Method S1 relies on the estimates with a linear age trend, which is 
unchanged by the reform. It adjusts the eligibility probabilities for unemployment or early 
retirement benefit receipt and applies the post-reform incentive and PDV measures. Method 
S2 is based on the age dummy model without a shift of the dummies. It is essentially the same 
as S1. However, the age dummy effects are far from linear and hence it is possible that these 
dummies better pick up the non-linearities in the various retirement and early retirement 
systems, or alternatively that tastes for leisure are not a linear function of age. Method S3 is 
based on the age dummy models and considers a shift of dummies to perform the simulations 
in a specific way for each one of the reforms. For the first reform, all age dummies are shifted 
upwards by three years. This also applies to those dummies at ages lower than the earliest 
eligibility age so that the entire retirement hazard shifts forward. For the common reform we 
proceed in a similar way, but the impact of age dummies is modify in a different way. On the 
one hand, given that in this policy simulation alternative retirement pathways are assumed 
out, we apply the age 51 dummy to all ages up to the age 59, just prior to the early retirement 
age, and this both for men and women. On the other hand, we keep the effect of age 60 and 65 
dummies unchanged assuming that the common reform will not affect individual behavior at 
these particular ages. Finally, using these two dummy values we imputed the values of the 
intermediary dummies, from age 61 to age 64, assuming a smooth path trend. As for the 
actuarial adjustment reform and the Belgian reform, methods S2  and S3 are equivalent, as 
there is no change in the key early and normal retirement ages from the baseline scenario to 
the reform situation. 
 
A first noticeable finding is that the PDV of benefits minus taxes is negative in all cases 
considered in Table 3, thus the results tell us that our cohort is a net contributor (benefits 
minus taxes and contributions) to the public finances. At first sight, this result looks rather 
surprising as it is contrary to intuition and contrary to the finding we can observe when purely 
focusing on the social security system. However, several factors help explain it. First, it is 
important to note that direct taxation is extremely heavy in Belgium. Second, discounting 
plays an important role in the results. While taxes are essentially front-loaded in the Belgian 
tax and social insurance system, benefits are rather back-loaded from a life-cycle perspective. 
Third, and last it is important to notice that we consider only a single outflow of the 
government budget, while we consider a large array of inflows into the budget. For example,  Table 3 : Total Fiscal Impact of Reform (in EUR per worker) 
  PDV    Total Change Relative to Base 
    Plus 3 years  Act. Adjust.  Common  Belgian    Plus 3 years  Act. Adjust.  Common  Belgian 
  Base  Reform  Reform  Reform  Reform    Reform  Reform  Reform  Reform 
    Peak Value – S1 
Benefits  146581  131131  120265  114111  141371    -10,5%  -18,0%  -22,2%  -3,6% 
Taxes: Payroll  58408  61934  64857  63625  59312    6,0%  11,0%  8,9%  1,5% 
Taxes: Income  80843  84908  85741  76989  81004    5,0%  6,1%  -4,8%  0,2% 
Taxes: VAT  19313  18744  18346  18280  19056    -2,9%  -5,0%  -5,4%  -1,3% 
Taxes: Total  158564  165586  168944  158893  159372    4,4%  6,5%  0,2%  0,5% 
    Peak Value – S2 
Benefits  147667  129241  120458  114115  142326    -12,5%  -18,4%  -22,7%  -3,6% 
Taxes: Payroll  57307  61548  63516  62234  58166    7,4%  10,8%  8,6%  1,5% 
Taxes: Income  79472  84478  83977  75300  79542    6,3%  5,7%  -5,3%  0,1% 
Taxes: VAT  19339  18759  18304  18250  19088    -3,0%  -5,4%  -5,6%  -1,3% 
Taxes: Total  156119  164785  165797  155784  156796    5,6%  6,2%  -0,2%  0,4% 
    Peak Value – S3 
Benefits  147667  129248  120458  114735  142326    -12,5%  -18,4%  -22,3%  -3,6% 
Taxes: Payroll  57307  66872  63516  65697  58166    16,7%  10,8%  14,6%  1,5% 
Taxes: Income  79472  90849  83977  79219  79542    14,3%  5,7%  -0,3%  0,1% 
Taxes: VAT  19339  19264  18304  18479  19088    -0,4%  -5,4%  -4,5%  -1,3% 
Taxes: Total  156119  176985  165797  163394  156796    13,4%  6,2%  4,7%  0,4% 
    Option Value – S1 
Benefits  145711  128967  115129  112722  140496    -11,5%  -21,0%  -22,6%  -3,6% 
Taxes: Payroll  58981  62731  63293  62491  59439    6,4%  7,3%  6,0%  0,8% 
Taxes: Income  82021  85663  81469  76800  81702    4,4%  -0,7%  -6,4%  -0,4% 
Taxes: VAT  20333  19605  19034  19039  20014    -3,6%  -6,4%  -6,4%  -1,6% 
Taxes: Total  161335  168000  163795  158330  161155    4,1%  1,5%  -1,9%  -0,1% 
    Option Value – S2 
Benefits  145529  126448  115273  112682  140577    -13,1%  -20,8%  -22,6%  -3,4% 
Taxes: Payroll  59882  63806  63223  62574  60228    6,6%  5,6%  4,5%  0,6% 
Taxes: Income  82656  86643  80937  76560  82286    4,8%  -2,1%  -7,4%  -0,4% 
Taxes: VAT  20354  19549  18996  19001  20043    -4,0%  -6,7%  -6,6%  -1,5% 
Taxes: Total  162891  169998  163156  158136  162557    4,4%  0,2%  -2,9%  -0,2% 
    Option Value – S3 
Benefits  145529  127191  115273  113163  140577    -12,6%  -20,8%  -22,2%  -3,4% 
Taxes: Payroll  59882  68464  63223  64393  60228    14,3%  5,6%  7,5%  0,6% 
Taxes: Income  82656  92441  80937  77924  82286    11,8%  -2,1%  -5,7%  -0,4% 
Taxes: VAT  20354  20050  18996  19312  20043    -1,5%  -6,7%  -5,1%  -1,5% 
Taxes: Total  162891  180955  163156  161629  162557    11,1%  0,2%  -0,8%  -0,2% we consider all tax revenues even though only part of them help towards financing goods and 
services for the elderly while some public subsidies to the old (more generous reimbursement 
of health expenditures, nursing home care, long-term care, public transportation, ...) do not 
appear on the outflow side. 
 
When measuring the impact of the various reforms on the different components reported in 
Table 3 as a proportion of the baseline benefits, we find that the common reform is the most 
powerful one in terms of the change in the PDV of benefits, followed b y the actuarial 
adjustment reform. This finding is not too surprising given the fact that Belgians leave the 
workforce rather early in their life-cycle, and hence are fully hit by the actuarial adjustments 
(actuarial adjustment and common reforms) and the reduced availability of benefits before the 
early retirement age of the social security system (common reform). The same lack of 
availability of benefits before the age of 60 is also the main cause of the drop in income tax 
receipt under the common reform, with a drop of 5 percent in all but the PV S3 simulation 
methodology. Overall, it is fair to say that the impact as measured using the PV and OV 
estimates are rather similar. 
 
As for the Belgian reform, it only displays a rather modest effect in terms of its impact on the 
value of the PDV of benefits, while its likely cost in terms of redistribution is rather heavy. 
Several reasons help explain this result. First, of all, the reform only affects the wage-earners 
schemes, which casts the order of magnitude of the change in a different light. Further, the 
effect of the changes only affects one particular form of retirement income, and does not 
affect payments either through the unemployment or the early retirement systems. Hence, the 
changes only affect people retiring early through the change of the benefits they receive 
starting at age 65, as the latter remains the age at which people are switched into the 
retirement system. Therefore, for a person aged 50, the effect of the changes only apply on 
income he s tarts receiving in 15 years time, and this with a 3 percent real discount factor per 
year. For a person aged 65, nothing much changes in terms of benefit receipt, unless 
obviously the person had experienced a longer spell on a social insurance program in the past. 
Finally, the reform is somewhat buffered against by the availability of means-tested minimum 
benefits, which increasingly become interesting substitutes for people with incomplete 
earnings histories due to sickness, unemployment, disability, ...  
 
To illustrate the distinction between behavioral and mechanical effects of a reform, let us 
focus on the net benefits an individual receives in a world of absolute certainty with respect to 
the life span. We denote them as b and they depend on a policy parameter x and on the age of 
retirement z, itself a function of x. We thus have 
 
  b(x,z(x)) 
 
A reform consists of a change from x to x'. The effect (Diff) of such a reform is: 
 
  Diff = b(x',z(x')) - b(x,z(x)) 
 
We can decompose Diff into two parts  Diff
m and  Diff
b corresponding to the mechanical and 
behavioral effects with  
 
  Diff 
m= b(x',z(x)) - b(x,z(x)) 
  Diff






Table 4 displays a strong behavioral effect for all scenarios. This is particularly true when 
considering the first reform using simulation technique S3 where the net behavioral effect of benefits minus contributions as a proportion of base benefits is anyway the most powerful 
(more than a quarter of base benefits). Table 4 shows that the behavioral  response for bothTable 4 : Decomposition of the Total Effect of Reform (in EUR per worker) 
Change in PDV   


















  Peak Value – S1 
Benefits  -19582  4132  -15450    -34745  8429  -26316    -35323  2853  -32470    -5073  -137  -5210 
Total Taxes  -3592  10614  7022    -10691  21070  10379    -12849  13177  329    -1360  2168  808 
Net Change  -15990  -6482  -22472    -24054  -12642  -36696    -22474  -10325  -32799    -3713  -2305  -6018 
Change as a % of Base Benefits  -10,9%  -4,4%  -15,3%    -16,4%  -8,6%  -25,0%    -15,3%  -7,0%  -22,4%    -2,5%  -1,6%  -4,1% 
  Peak Value – S2 
Benefits  -20635  2210  -18425    -36142  8934  -27208    -36498  2945  -33552    -5242  -99  -5341 
Total Taxes  -3787  12453  8666    -10963  20641  9678    -13028  12692  -335    -1416  2092  677 
Net Change  -16849  -10243  -27092    -25179  -11707  -36886    -23470  -9747  -33217    -3826  -2191  -6018 
Change as a % of Base Benefits  -11,4%  -6,9%  -18,3%    -17,1%  -7,9%  -25,0%    -15,9%  -6,6%  -22,5%    -2,6%  -1,5%  -4,1% 
  Peak Value – S3 
Benefits  -20635  2217  -18418    -36142  8934  -27208    -36498  3566  -32932    -5242  -99  -5341 
Total Taxes  -3787  24653  20866    -10963  20641  9678    -13028  20302  7275    -1416  2092  677 
Net Change  -16849  -22436  -39284    -25179  -11707  -36886    -23470  -16737  -40206    -3826  -2191  -6018 
Change as a % of Base Benefits  -11,4%  -15,2%  -26,6%    -17,1%  -7,9%  -25,0%    -15,9%  -11,3%  -27,2%    -2,6%  -1,5%  -4,1% 
  Option Value – S1 
Benefits  -18530  1785  -16745    -33786  3203  -30583    -34554  1565  -32990    -4947  -268  -5216 
Total Taxes  -3657  10323  6666    -10882  13343  2461    -13047  10042  -3004    -1389  1210  -179 
Net Change  -14873  -8538  -23410    -22904  -10140  -33044    -21508  -8478  -29986    -3558  -1478  -5036 
Change as a % of Base Benefits  -10,2%  -5,9%  -16,1%    -15,7%  -7,0%  -22,7%    -14,8%  -5,8%  -20,6%    -2,4%  -1,0%  -3,5% 
  Option Value – S2 
Benefits  -18931  -150  -19081    -33102  2846  -30256    -34194  1346  -32848    -4729  -223  -4952 
Total Taxes  -3743  10849  7107    -10764  11029  265    -13036  8280  -4755    -1307  973  -334 
Net Change  -15188  -11000  -26188    -22338  -8183  -30521    -21158  -6934  -28092    -3422  -1195  -4618 
Change as a % of Base Benefits  -10,4%  -7,6%  -18,0%    -15,3%  -5,6%  -21,0%    -14,5%  -4,8%  -19,3%    -2,4%  -0,8%  -3,2% 
  Option Value – S3 
Benefits  -18931  593  -18338    -33102  2846  -30256    -34194  1827  -32367    -4729  -223  -4952 
Total Taxes  -3743  21806  18064    -10764  11029  265    -13036  11774  -1262    -1307  973  -334 
Net Change  -15188  -21213  -36401    -22338  -8183  -30521    -21158  -9947  -31105    -3422  -1195  -4618 
Change as a % of Base Benefits  -10,4%  -14,6%  -25,0%    -15,3%  -5,6%  -21,0%    -14,5%  -6,8%  -21,4%    -2,4%  -0,8%  -3,2% OV and PV estimations of the latter scenario imply a fiscal impact of the behavioral response 
that represents more than 50 percent of the total effect, essentially because of the outright 
shift by 3 years of all dummies. At first sight it might be curious to have a fiscal implication 
of the behavioral effect that is negative, i.e. that the cohort's contribution to the government 
budget increases as a reaction to the change in its behavior. However, the finding is less 
surprising when we notice that another important variable has changed as a consequence of 
this change in behavior, notably the length of the working life. Hence, the "loss" of the cohort 
in terms of net benefits minus taxes has to be seen as a tradeoff for the "gain" in income due 
to a higher average working life.  
 
Another puzzling point from Table 4 is the indetermination in the sign of the behavioral effect 
on the PDV of benefits. It is positive in most cases except for the Belgian Reform, as well as 
for the case of simulation methodology S2 in the Option Value model. Table 5 illustrates the 
decomposition by age of retirement of the fiscal implication of the behavioral effect on 
benefits for a median household facing the actuarial adjustment reform. It appears that the 
behavioral effect is negative until age 60 and then turns positive, the sign coming from the 
sign of the probability change. Even with the negative p robability changes larger than the 
positive ones in absolute value, as is the case in our example, we can observe that the total 
behavioral effect for this household is positive. The structure of the post-reform PDV of 
benefits by age of exit of the labor  force helps explain this finding. As the actuarial 
adjustment reform is much less penalizing in the age range 61-70 than between the ages of 50 
and 60, the PDV of benefits is steeply increasing as a function of age of labor force exit and 
hence leads to a  positive behavioral effect when aggregating up over all possible exit ages. 
The same reasoning can be applied to the common reform and to a certain level to the Belgian 
reform. In this case, as the structure of the post-reform PDV of benefits does not change a lot 
from the base case, the negative probability changes, which extend typically from 50 to 56, 
create a larger behavioral effect than the positive one on the age range 57-70. As to the “Plus 
3 years” reform, the probability changes are so erratic that no typical rules can be found.       
 
Table 5 : Decomposition of the behavioral effect on benefits for a median household (Actuarial 
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Base case   Actuarial Adjustment Reform       
Age   
(a)  (b)    (c)  (d)    (d)-(b)=(e)  (e)*(c) 
                   
50    329538  0.82    224385  0.44    -0.38  -855 
51    337893  0.99    227271  0.53    -0.47  -1057 
52    347071  2.02    229978  1.09    -0.92  -2122 
53    354961  2.19    233078  1.17    -1.02  -2379 
54    362829  2.97    236653  1.59    -1.38  -3263 
55    369887  5.84    240407  3.32    -2.51  -6043 
56    376577  5.21    243768  3.01    -2.20  -5366 
57    383305  8.28    246404  4.98    -3.30  -8131 
58    388166  9.85    253870  6.62    -3.23  -8198 
59    393696  4.41    266432  3.14    -1.27  -3392 
60    398815  19.11    279171  18.42    -0.69  -1922 
61    389943  11.52    296357  14.09    2.57  7604 
62    389340  4.41    319259  5.86    1.45  4619 
63    386618  3.77    340224  5.56    1.79  6084 
64    383631  2.58    360614  4.15    1.58  5684 
65    381773  6.73    381773  12.05    5.33  20332 
66    356814  2.71    356814  4.86    2.15  7667 67    333433  1.09    333433  1.96    0.86  2883 
68    311112  0.44    311112  0.79    0.35  1081 
69    289168  0.18    289168  0.32    0.14  404 
70    268414  0.12    268414  0.21    0.09  254 
                   
Total                  13886 
 
Figures A1 to A7 in the appendix illustrate the effects of the "three-year-increase" reform 
along several different margins. Figure A1 displays the PDV of benefits per worker at any 
given age of retirement, as well as the impact thereon by the reform. Figure A2 summarizes 
the total of taxes paid by age of labor force exit. This graph again illustrates the fact that the 
elderly are still important contributors to the federal budget. This is particularly true for those 
working till relatively late in their life cycle, as the fiscal pressure on the productive factor 
labor is relatively high compared to the pressure on pension benefits. Figure A3 and A5 
display the simulated patterns of labor force exit over the age range 50-70, which follows a 
rather smooth pattern for the S1 simulation methodology, and a more erratic one for 
simulation methodology S3. The role of the shift in the age dummies becomes evident in 
figure A5. Figures A4 and A6 display the age-specific impact of the reform, with a rather 
modest net change (PDV of benefits minus taxes) at all ages, whereas the change of the PDV 
of benefits is of varying sign and characterized by larger swings in magnitude. Clearly, the tax 
system (payroll, income and consumption) plays an important role in the determination of the 
sign and magnitude of the net contribution to the federal budget at all possible exit ages. 
Figure A7 illustrates the power of these fiscal implications as a proportion of GDP. The figure 
shows that the mechanical effects are approximately of the same size for all possible 
simulation methodologies, but that the difference between these reforms stems from the 
behavioral effect.  
 
Figures B1-B3-B7, C1-C3-C7 and D1-D3-D7 in the appendix illustrate the key results for the 
other three reforms in terms of the changes in the PDV of benefits and in the retirement 
probabilities at the different ages, as well as the fiscal implications as a proportion of GDP. 
The latter indicator allows a comparison of the total budgetary effect of the various reforms in 
terms of a common measure. It appears that – budgetarily speaking – the actuarial adjustment 
reform is the most powerful reform in all cases excluding those relying on the S3 
methodology. Even if it is the common reform that has the strongest impact on the level of 
benefits because of its inherent ineligibility to retirement benefits before the age 60, it is the 
actuarial adjustment reform that creates the strongest incentives for individuals to work 
longer. Indeed, a comparison of Figure C3 with Figure B3 shows that the retirement rate is 
lower for the actuarial adjustment reform before age 60 and a bit higher after this age.  
6. Distributional analysis 
 
Table 6 and Table 7 display the distributional implications of the reforms when splitting the 
population into 5 income categories. A common feature of the first three reforms is that the 
three middle earnings quintiles, hence the middle classes, bear the brunt of the reform. This is 
particularly true for the common reform,  where the impact on the two extreme income 
quintiles is much less pronounced. The results are less extreme for the case of the plus-three-
year reform, where the changes of all income quintiles are relatively close to one another as 
expressed in these relative terms. The actuarial adjustment reform again is the middle ground. 
Only the lowest income quintile loses less in relative terms under this reform proposal.  
 
The Belgian reform on the other hand has a very different redistributive pattern. While 
income quintiles 3 and 4 again face the largest proportional change as displayed in tables Z, it 
is now the lowest income quintile that loses out more than the first and second income 
quintiles. The reasons for this finding are multiple. First, they are due to t he way the reform only affects those that are on the wage-earner scheme. Hence it does not affect civil servants 
who have relatively high life-cycle earnings, hence making them relatively more numerous in 
the upper income quintiles. Second, the reform only touches those with incomplete careers, 
and hence essentially touches two categories of people. First, it affects those with unstable   
Table 6: Distributional Analysis (Option Value - S1 - in EUR per worker) 
  PDV    Total Change Relative to Base 
    Plus 3 years  Act. Adjust.  Common  Belgian    Plus 3 years  Act. Adjust.  Common  Belgian 
  Base  Reform  Reform  Reform  Reform    Reform  Reform  Reform  Reform 
  Quintile 1 (highest) 
Benefits  178937  162404  144532  139462  176790    -16532  -34405  -39475  -2146 
Total Taxes  344551  355545  348705  336867  344937    10994  4154  -7684  386 
Net Change              -27527  -38559  -31790  -2532 
Change as a % of Base Benefits              -15,4%  -21,5%  -17,8%  -1,4% 
  Quintile 2 
Benefits  168756  148930  129998  123519  163889    -19825  -38757  -45237  -4866 
Total Taxes  179867  187627  182373  174499  179591    7759  2506  -5369  -276 
Net Change              -27584  -41263  -39868  -4590 
Change as a % of Base Benefits              -16,3%  -24,5%  -23,6%  -2,7% 
  Quintile 3 
Benefits  146169  128311  111982  111320  138546    -17857  -34187  -34848  -7622 
Total Taxes  129816  136579  133288  129335  129193    6763  3472  -481  -623 
Net Change              -24620  -37659  -34368  -7000 
Change as a % of Base Benefits              -16,8%  -25,8%  -23,5%  -4,8% 
  Quintile 4 
Benefits  128841  112534  100241  100403  121227    -16307  -28600  -28438  -7614 
Total Taxes  95886  101052  98347  96358  95420    5166  2461  472  -466 
Net Change              -21473  -31061  -28910  -7148 
Change as a % of Base Benefits              -16,7%  -24,1%  -22,4%  -5,5% 
  Quintile 5 (lowest) 
Benefits  107197  93953  90059  89672  103394    -13243  -17137  -17525  -3803 
Total Taxes  62412  65154  62181  60100  62525    2743  -230  -2312  113 
Net Change              -15986  -16907  -15213  -3916 
Change as a % of Base Benefits              -14,9%  -15,8%  -14,2%  -3,7% Table 7 : Distributional Analysis (Option Value – S3 - in EUR per worker) 
  PDV    Total Change Relative to Base 
    Plus 3 years  Act. Adjust.  Common  Belgian    Plus 3 years  Act. Adjust.  Common  Belgian 
  Base  Reform  Reform  Reform  Reform    Reform  Reform  Reform  Reform 
  Quintile 1 (highest) 
Benefits  178632  160507  145089  141042  176857    -18125  -33543  -37590  -1775 
Total Taxes  347617  378058  348367  336839  347803    30442  750  -10777  187 
Net Change              -48567  -34293  -26813  -1962 
Change as a % of Base Benefits              -27,2%  -19,2%  -15,0%  -1,1% 
  Quintile 2   
Benefits  168531  147322  130005  124102  164006    -21209  -38527  -44429  -4525 
Total Taxes  181871  202958  181412  178730  181441    21087  -459  -3141  -430 
Net Change              -42296  -38068  -41288  -4096 
Change as a % of Base Benefits              -25,1%  -22,6%  -24,5%  -2,4% 
  Quintile 3   
Benefits  145861  126299  112007  111834  138538    -19563  -33854  -34028  -7324 
Total Taxes  131559  149047  132702  134240  130749    17489  1143  2681  -810 
Net Change              -37051  -34997  -36709  -6514 
Change as a % of Base Benefits              -25,4%  -24,0%  -25,2%  -4,5% 
  Quintile 4   
Benefits  128618  110460  100250  100573  121214    -18158  -28368  -28045  -7405 
Total Taxes  96845  110481  97713  100710  96233    13635  868  3864  -612 
Net Change              -31793  -29236  -31910  -6793 
Change as a % of Base Benefits              -24,7%  -22,7%  -24,8%  -5,3% 
  Quintile 5 (lowest)   
Benefits  107308  92616  90171  89036  103608    -14692  -17136  -18272  -3699 
Total Taxes  62565  70500  61603  63090  62591    7934  -962  524  26 
Net Change              -22626  -16174  -18796  -3725 
Change as a % of Base Benefits              -21,1%  -15,1%  -17,5%  -3,5% and incomplete career patterns due to sickness, invalidity, unemployment or accident. Second, 
it changes incentives for those choosing to retire early. Hence, the reform is less important for 





The analysis shows the large potential budgetary impact of various hypothetical reforms. 
These reforms, though clearly selected for comparative and illustrative purposes, illustrate the 
importance of behavioral effects that the citizens display when faced with a varying landscape 
in terms of the social insurance architecture. Different real-life reform alternatives are 
imaginable in the Belgian context. Any such real-life alternative will have to include  – at least 
to some degree  – some elements analyzed in our stylized scenarios, for example, changes in 
the key retirement ages, the use of actuarial adjustment factors and a convergence between the 
three main retirement systems, while at the same time not forgetting the labor demand side. 
The common reform admittedly looks somewhat unrealistic. In that sense, our "Belgian 
reform" is a first step in the direction of getting these hypothetical simulations closer to the 
field. B y eliminating one particular aspect of our largely Bismarckian system, namely an 
aspect that is not insurance based, we reestablish a clearer link between contributions and 
benefits. The results indicate that even such a partial reform might have important 
consequences, not only in levels but also on the distributional side. The results of the present 
distributional analysis also illustrate the need to refine the analysis in future research.  
 
However, we would like to insist on the fact that the analysis h eavily relies on some 
assumptions we made, most notably the limitation to the cohort of 50 year olds and the steady 
state assumption, which both clearly limit the generality with which one can apply the above 
results to real-world proposals. Hence there is a clear need for further research to get the 
reform proposals closer in line with politically feasible and economically viable alternatives 
over the long run, as well as to check the robustness of our simulation approach. 
 
The present paper shows that the social security system at large (i.e. including unemployment 
and disability insurance as well as early retirement schemes) induces Belgian workers to retire 
earlier than they ought to. Most reforms contemplated imply that we bring this comprehensive 
social security package closer to actuarial fairness. We realize that this is questionable and 
ought to be viewed as a first step towards a more complete analysis of reforms. Assume 
indeed that a fraction of these early retirees who draw benefits from disability benefits are 
truly disabled and a fraction of those drawing benefits from unemployment insurance are truly 
involuntarily unemployed. A  good reform should attempt to identify these workers and let 
them benefit from social insurance. This may imply improving the audit and control 
procedures, particularly for unemployment. Then for the remaining early voluntary early 
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